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Fraud and Internal Control 
DESPITE the efforts of legislators, government and corporation officials, 
and accountants, fraud and embezzle-
ment schemes continue to grow and even 
to flourish in infinite variety. The in-
crease in number has been accompanied by 
more ingenious and diabolical methods of 
effecting and concealing the misappropria-
tions. It is obvious that the business 
world must establish every possible safe-
guard to protect itself against these nefari-
ous schemes. Public accountants can do 
much to curb these manipulations. How-
ever, to control fraud most effectively, the 
business man must help protect himself 
by using a good system of internal control 
for his organization, and having public 
accountants determine at frequent inter-
vals whether the system is effectual. 
Most embezzlements within a business 
organization have been committed by an 
employe who has had access to the com-
pany's cash. Consequently, systems of 
internal control within some companies 
have been designed to give particular atten-
tion to the employes connected with the 
cash situation, but have failed to take 
other employes and their duties into con-
sideration. Recently, however, a case has 
come to light in which an employe who had 
no access to cash was able to defraud the 
company of about $70,000 through a 
scheme, crafty and daring in its com-
pleteness. 
The company's warehouse was in a 
different city from that in which the pur-
chasing department and general offices 
were situated. The purchasing depart-
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ment's procedure prescribed that requisi-
tions for all needed material and supplies 
be sent to the purchasing department; 
however, because of general laxness, this 
practice was not always followed. Pur-
chase orders were supposed to be prepared 
in the purchasing department from the 
requisitions. Practically all purchases 
were shipped direct to the warehouse, and 
all invoices were sent direct to the pur-
chasing department. 
Copies of the receiving reports, which 
were prepared in duplicate at the ware-
house, were forwarded to the purchasing 
department. Upon receipt of these copies, 
the purchasing agent approved the in-
voices for payment after verifications and 
distribution had been made in his depart-
ment. The accounting department ac-
cepted the approval of the purchasing agent 
without further investigation, and prepared 
vouchers for the treasurer to pay. 
The laxness in the system of internal 
control caused by assigning to the pur-
chasing agent the authority to approve 
receipt of goods and approve invoices for 
payment gave him opportunity for fraud. 
His plans for embezzlement show an 
unusual amount of care and thoroughness. 
He opened offices in several buildings under 
the names of bogus companies and hired 
employes to attend to them. He opened 
bank accounts at various banks for these 
same bogus companies. He had invoices 
printed with the names of the companies 
and had these invoices, representing false 
charges, sent for payment to the company 
of which he was purchasing agent. 
The embezzler forged receiving reports 
and attached them to the spurious invoices 
which he approved for payment. The fake 
invoices together with the forged receiving 
reports then were forwarded to the account-
ing department for entry and payment in 
accordance with the usual procedure. The 
distribution of the irregular vouchers was 
almost entirely to the general ledger ac-
count—"Warehouse Stock." Checks in 
payment of the spurious invoices were sent 
to the addresses shown on the invoices, and 
were received by the employes of the de-
faulter and deposited in the banks. The 
deposits were subsequently withdrawn by 
the purchasing agent. 
In an effort to avoid attracting attention 
to his manipulations, the embezzler in a 
few cases actually had material shipped to 
the company's warehouse. Such material 
he purchased personally and had it shipped 
to the bogus companies, to be reshipped by 
them to the company which he was de-
frauding. 
The manipulation was first discovered 
after the purchasing agent's resignation 
when an employe in the accounting depart-
ment noticed discrepancies between certain 
invoices and receiving reports received sub-
sequent to the defaulter's resignation. 
Public accountants were called in to de-
termine the amount of the embezzlement. 
This case illustrates the possibilities of 
fraud inherent in a situation where one 
man not only issues purchase orders, but 
also receives material received forms and 
approves invoices for payment. In this 
case, under a properly operated system of 
internal control, the manipulations could 
not have been effected, because the re-
ceiving reports would have been received 
and approved by the accounting depart-
ment and the discrepancy between the 
spurious invoices and the receiving reports 
would have been apparent. And, it is 
conceivable that certain types of audit 
procedure might not have detected the 
shortage prior to the purchasing agent's 
resignation. 
Had the material received forms been 
received and the invoices been approved 
for payment by some other individual than 
the purchasing agent, or someone under 
his control, he could not possibly, without 
collusion, have carried on his fraudulent 
operations undiscovered. 
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However, to be effective, a system of 
internal check must not only work well on 
paper, but must be followed strictly in 
actual practice. Someone not an operative 
under the system must ascertain at fre-
quent intervals that the system is being 
carried out as planned, and that each in-
dividual is performing only the task to 
which he has been assigned. It should be 
the duty of public accountants when they 
notice any one employe performing a com-
bination of duties which admit of fraud to 
report such conditions to the officers of the 
company, even though fraud, in that in-
stance, is not suspected, and even though 
the accountants have not been asked to 
make comments on the system. Many 
times such a warning by the accountant 
may lead to further investigation, which 
may uncover an unsuspected shortage or 
may result in system reform and thus 
check potential fraud. 
In the case of the manipulations by the 
purchasing agent, it is doubtful whether 
the fraud would have been uncovered by 
restricted audit procedure previous to the 
resignation of the defaulter. Full audit 
procedure might have revealed an em-
bezzlement of this type because of an inven-
tory shortage or through a comparison of 
the signatures on the material received 
forms with the signature of the individual 
designated to prepare them. It seems 
that in the case in question no book in-
ventory was kept, so that an inventory 
shortage did not appear; it was reflected 
in an increase in the cost of goods sold. 
While it is possible that an accountant 
might have discovered the shortage through 
a comparison of signatures, nevertheless, 
detecting forged signatures is exceedingly 
difficult when the forger is proficient. The 
accountant would have noticed the increase 
in cost of sales if it was relatively large yet 
it might have been almost impossible in 
this case for him to discover the cause of 
such increase. Although the accountant 
might not have uncovered the fraud in this 
case, he should be expected to report to 
the company officials any combination of 
duties which in his opinion might be used 
to perpetrate fraud. Accountants must 
use every precaution possible and be ever 
alert to be able to cope successfully with 
the "trusted" embezzler whose craftiness 
and cunning seem to be eternally increasing. 
